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lite peut etre discutee a !'occasion d'un litige contre une decision individuelle qui s'y 
refererait»45• Comment le juge pourrait-il affirmer cela si les lignes directrices ne 
constituaient pas un acte juridique? La justiciabilite de ce type de mesures, meme si 
c' est une justiciabilite indirecte, conduit par consequent a faire rentrer ces actes non 
contraignants dans la categorie des actes administratifs unilateraux. 
La jurisprudence que nous venons d'analyser atteste que «le juridique ne se reduit 
plus a l'imperatif»46• De tres nombreux actes administratifs, tout en etant des actes 
juridiques, sont ainsi depourvus de caractere imperatif. Par consequent, l'acte admi-
nistratif unilateral n'est plus necessairement un acte contraignant. On peut meme 
dire qu'il l'est meme de moins en moins. En effet, !'utilisation de cette maniere de 
faire par I' Administration ne cesse de se developper, ce qui est de nature a «contri-
buer au renouvellement de l 'Etat, par un elargissement de la gamme des moyens 
d'action des pouvoirs publics»47• Selon le Conseil d'Etat: «L'administration y trouve 
de nouvelles marges de manreuvre et d'action, les usagers, de leur cote, sont places 
dans une situation plus ouverte, disposant de solutions alternatives a la contrainte»48 • 
Cette ·situation nouvelle est !'illustration d'une certaine defiance des societes ac-
tuelles aux procedes de contrainte. Aujourd'hui, le droit apparait peut-etre moins 
comme un procede contraignant que comme un procede destine a se proteger de la 
contrainte. Mais ceci est un autre sujet. 
45 Conseil d'Etat, 18 octobre 1991, Union nationale de la proprietr? immobiliere, n° 75831. 
46 W. Zagorski, op. cit., p. 59. 
47 Le droit souple, rapport precite, p. 16. 
48 Ibid. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea for my contribution to this conference stems from a brief and quite self-
evident argument: law is not always the way we normally conceive it, namely a set 
of 'constraints,' a limit or a restriction in our lives or an elaborate set of 'no state-
ments' that steers our lives. 1 Furthermore, in law there is room for innovation and 
for the possibility of inducing people to make decisions based not merely on their 
fear of a sanction or their desire for a reward. Recognizing law as something more 
than a source of obligations and duties could help not only regulators to better de-
cide and distribute resources, but also citizens to feel the law as a potential for their 
lives.2 
One of the most prominent fields of innovation in law comes today from the find-
ings of 'cognitive sciences' revealing the way in which the study of people's cogni-
tive behaviour can be a source for improving effectiveness and enforcement of law.3 
The idea of law as a constraint is at the roots of the development of the Etat de droit in France 
and Italy. For an understanding of the classic depiction of coercion in law see: P. Costa, The 
Rule of Law: A Historical Introduction, in The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism, ed. 
P. Costa and D. Zolo (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 73-152; L. Green, Law and Obligations, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. J. L Coleman and 
S. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2002), 514-15; D. Galligan, Law in Modem Society 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2007), 142-55. 
2 I owe the opportunity for broadening my idea of law as something more than a source of 
constraints to the reading of A. Simoncini, Cos'e Il Diritto? Una Domanda «Persistente», in La 
Lotta Tra Diritto E Giustizia, ed. F. Ventorino, P. Barcellona, and A. Simoncini (Genova-
Milano: Marietti 1820, 2008), 147-220. 
3 The central project of this new way of understanding law is summarized by T. S. Ulen, The 
Importance of Behavioral Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the 
Law, ed. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 93-95. 
'the study of law and behavior is distinctive because law seeks to intentionally shape people's 
behavior by reference to some measure of social good. This distinguishes it from fields based 
on manipulation for individual ends, such as advertising or marketing; from fields oriented o~ 
thought rather than behavior, such as much of philosophy; and, importantly, from other behav-
ioral fields that are based on descriptive or evaluative treatments of behavior, such as anthro-
pology, sociology, psychology, and economics, which do not necessarily seek to control what 
they study nor to engage in normative policy analysis.' 
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When studies of law move in this direction, they change their approach to the sub-
ject of investigation and enlarge the field of inquiry over the whole spectrum of 
mere conduct to go deeper into the intimate sphere of each individual, to the abyss 
of the cognitive processes. 4 
Cognitive findings constitute a challenge for rule-making since the aim of every 
regulation and legislation is the effective change of individual behaviour. 5 Knowing 
the secrets of these practices and the way to incorporate them into law and regula-
tion represents a way to improve rule-making processes. 6 
My goal here is to understand and explore this 'unorthodox' innovation by investi-
gating its major quality, namely the transformation it produces in both the organiza-
tion and the regulation of states. Of course, I do not intend to cover all the 
possibilities given by this discourse; rather I aim to draw a general overview of these 
instruments from the point of view of public law. Therefore, after a clarification of 
the problem from which these new instruments derive, I will discuss the so-called 
'institutions' of behavioural law- and policy-making. Following this, I will describe 
how the regulatory process should change in order to admit evidence from the cog-
nitive sciences. Finally, my purpose is to analyse the limits of this innovation from 
the point of view oflegal theory. 
2. Why Innovate Law and Regulation? 
When you begin to study law - and particularly constitutional law - one of the most 
fascinating ideas that you learn is the tendency ofevery legal system to be flawless. 7 
In the ideal world created or supposed by scholars, legal rules are based on perfect 
information and strictly regulate social behaviour in its multiple forms, even follow-
ing rapid mutations; norms reflect with a high degree of perfection the social, eco-
4 A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, in: Haifa Law Review, 4 (2008). 
5 J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
See also Donald C Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in 
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, in: Vanderbilt Law Review 51, Nr. 6 (1998). 
6 I intend here the words rule-making and law-making as quasi-synonyms. Even if in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition law-making is broadly speaking the business of both parliaments and judges, I 
am using it specifically as the business of those who draft the laws and of those who instruct 
the draftsmen. For more see M Zander, The Law-Making Process, 7th ed. (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2015). 
7 This is mostly due to the influence of 'positivism' in the Italian legal academia. N. Bobbio, Il 
Positivismo Giuridico. Lezioni Di Filosofia Del Diritto (Torino, 1979). :j (1 
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nomic and political conditions of their time and are capable of steering people's 
lives in a way that no other instrument can do. 8 
However, this ideal world does not exist in practice. Laws and rules are imperfect 
and only seldom produce the outcome they promise. As legal scholars have recently 
proved, 'the lack of a clear, explicit, behavioural model inevitably generates contra-
dictions in the law. ' 9 
In addition to these challenges, there is another issue that is becoming progressively 
more evident at present: ruling this society has become increasingly challenging due 
to the increasing mix of social, economic, and technological factors. 10 This profound 
transformation does not always interact well with traditional instruments in the 
hands of legislators and policy-makers. Classic organizations and instruments of 
regulation are considered against the evolution of society. Regulators and legislators 
are required to be smarter, enact simpler rules, minimize bad laws, regulate without 
curbing innovation, and reduce unnecessary burdens on the private sector.11 
These challenges make it much more difficult for legislators to mirror society and to 
effectively regulate entire sectors of life. At a time like this, dynamic legislative and 
regulative instruments must be sought so as to produce laws and rules that are effec-
tive and really hit the target set by regulators. 
A quest for these instruments implies an understanding of the level of complexity of 
the workings of human behaviour and the way in which each rule performs in order 
to best achieve its aim. 
Human behaviour is a key element of modem society and, consequently, one of the 
first aspects to investigate in order to understand how to regulate it. For a long time, 
cognitive scientists have been revealing the complexity of individual decision-
making. 12 Indeed, for several reasons we do not always act as rational agents. This 
8 L. Kap/ow, General Characteristics of Rules, in The Economics of Crime and Litigation. Vol. 5 
of Encyclopediaof Law and Economics, ed. Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit DeGeest 
(Cheltenham, 2000). 
9 A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, cit. 239. 
10 See R. Hassan, Empires of Speed: Time and the Acceleration of Politics and Society (Leiden: 
Brill, 2009); J. 0 McGinnis, Laws for Leaming in an Age of Acceleration, in William & Mary 
Law Review 53, no. 2 (2011); H Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
11 It is possible to find a very complete array of these problems in the recent book by S. 
Ranchordas, Constitutional Sunsets and Experimental Legislation. A Comparative Perspective 
(Cheltenham, 2014). 
12 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in: Science 
185, no. 4157 (1974). 
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may be due to lack of information, deficit of cognitive capacity or self-control, and a 
series of heuristics and shorthand methods of using information. 13 
By representing how people actually make choices, cognitive sciences could help 
rule-makers and thus give them another tool able to reduce the risk of regulatory 
failure, which is induced either by a lack of consideration of behavioural limitations, 
or by the irrationality of human behaviour, or simply by the failure of mechanisms 
of coercion. 14 
3. Behaviourally Informed Law- and Policy-Making 
The last ten years have witnessed an increasing effort made by many governments to 
deal with the challenge of how to effectively guide and control the behaviour of their 
citizens in order to reach the social, economic, and even cultural goals enshrined in 
their laws and regulations. 
Influencing conduct for the public welfare is, of course, not a new task for govern-
ments. They accomplish this aim either directly, through sanctions, fear of a sanc-
tion or desire for rewards or indirectly, by changing the attitudes to the regulated 
behaviour. 15 The economic crisis we are facing at this moment of time, as well as the 
transformation of the economy and the social acceleration driven by globalization 
and JCT, 16 has highlighted the need to either transform or replace traditional strate-
gies used to modify people's behaviour with other tools better suited for reaching 
objectives established by public policies.17 
When a government designs a public policy it tries to achieve various goals: a strong 
economy, better education, security, health and so on. To reach these targets, gov-
ernments employ many tools, including laws, punishments and regulations, taxes 
and subsidies, the provision of public services, information and even persuasion. 
13 F. Di Porto and N Rangone, Cognitive-Based Regulation: New Challenges for Regulators, in: 
Federa!ismi.it, no. 20 (2013). 
14 D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York, 2012). 
15 Paradoxically, this indirect path can work as a shortcut, particularly if the regulation changes 
attitudes to the underlying morality of the behaviour. If law succeeds in changing moral con-
victions, regulators must reduce the need to act on or even monitor regulated players. See 
K. Bitz and J Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Changes, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law, ed. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman 
(Oxford, 2014), 241. 
16 A. Simoncini, The Constitutional Dimension of the Internet: Some Research Paths, EUI 
Working Paper LAW 2016116 (2016), http://ssm.com/abstract=2781496. 
17 A. Oliver, From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector 
Policy, in Journal of Social Policy 42, no. 04 (2013). 
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Many of these tools are designed to influence change·s in public behaviour and often 
have a paternalistic purpose. 
Legal scholars have already learned that they cannot take as legally relevant only the 
behaviour of a 'rational individual. ' 18 Social scientists have revealed that the leading 
theory of human behaviour - rational choice theory (RCT), which was developed by 
economists in the 1950s and came into law through the rise of law and economics -
has significant shortcomings.19 By using the theory of 'bounded rationality' con-
ceived many years ago by Herbert A. Simon, behavioural analysis has shown that in 
decision-making the rationality of individuals is limited by the information they 
have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they 
have to make a decision.20 The characteristic of the judgment leads decision-makers 
frequently and predictably to deviate from the normative standards of strictly ration-
al behaviour. 
By considering only the 'rational individual' as the subject of rules, rule-makers 
tend to limit their judgment and capacity for decision-making, and consequently to 
make mispredictions and produce ineffective regulation and legislation. A more 
realistic view of human beings reveals that individuals make mistakes in their judg-
ments and decision-making, and these faults should be considered during the prepa-
ration of laws and policies. 21 The behavioural approach suggests that the 
incorporation of findings on human behaviour in legal studies could be very helpful 
for decision-makers in reaching the social goals they want to achieve. Behavioural 
analysis asserts, indeed, that the efficacy of the law depends on accounting for rele-
vant patterns of human behaviour identified by experimental findings and evidence 
of legal importance. The behavioural analysis of law ventures to provide a better 
understanding of the innumerable interactions between legal rules and behaviour 
without commitment to any particular value system. 22 
18 For a complete understanding of this argument see A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, cit. 240-42. 
19 Ulen, The Importance ofBehavioral Law, 93. 
20 The concept of 'bounded rationality' was originally developed by Herbert A. Simon in the 
article: Herbert Alexander Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in The quarterly 
journal of economics 69, no. 1 (1955). See also of the same author Administrative Behavior: A 
Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, 4 ed. (The Free Press, 
1997). See also A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, cit. 242. 'To sur-
vive and function in a complex world individuals use mental and emotional heuristics when 
making judgments under uncertainty; they also rely extensively on situational cues to guide 
their choices.' 
21 C. Jolls, C. R Sunstein, and R. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in 
Stanford Law Review 50, no. 3 (1998). 
22 See A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, cit. 243. 
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Today, this task has become much more important than in the past. The growing 
number of policy issues where modifying human behaviour is very complex reveals 
that the effectiveness of traditional approaches may be limited without some addi-
tional tools and understanding of how citizens really behave. In areas of health, 
food, crime, welfare, environment, employment, and education governments and 
policy designers have felt the need for a more sophisticated understanding of the 
factors influencing human life. The behavioural analysis of the law and regulation 
has revealed that in order to design a policy in these areas it is necessary to have a 
better understanding of how the traditional normative tools can be supplemented by 
insights from behavioural change theory and evidence at the individual, interperson-
al and community levels. 
As a result, policy-makers seek out more sophisticated means by which they can 
both build more effective relationships between citizens and government and influ-
ence public behaviour - particularly with a view to increasing personal responsibil-
ity in areas like health and welfare, encouraging greater partnership between users of 
services and service providers or using information campaigns.23 
When compared with other tools, behaviourally informed strategies present more 
effective outcomes, often delivered for less cost, particularly if a longer-term time 
frame is taken to evaluate the costs and benefits. 
The behavioural approach thus provides an 'empirically-based middle ground' 24 
between the theoretical abstractions of the rational-actor model and the implicit, 
intuitive, and unstructured view of human behaviour of traditional legal scholarship. 
Moreover, it helps policy-makers in general, and particularly legislators or lawmak-
ers, to improve the toolbox of the instruments necessary to pursue their goals. To-
day, governments seek new instruments to motivate people to change their '«self 
and society»-harming behaviours, without imposing further regulations or bans on 
23 Regulation of tobacco is a good example of a mix of tools imposed to discourage and discredit 
the consumption of cigars and cigarettes. Another example occurs when regulation tries to en-
courage breastfeeding. Governments could use both information campaigns and other rules that 
normalize the behaviour as natural (in workplace), and not a shameful activity to be hidden 
away. See Bilz and Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Changes, 242. 
Legal scholars have found that there are at least three tools used in regulation. The policy-
maker can use: a) traditional 'command and control' tools (such as coercion, bans, authoriza-
tions) with the paternalistic aim of forbidding certain conduct in order to prevent errors; b) 
tools for empowering subjects in order to educate them to cope with errors (information); c) de-
regulation as a form of extreme non-paternalistic tool to maximize individual responsibility; d) 
behaviourally informed strategies for avoiding mistakes and (soft paternalism) gently helping 
people to achieve outcomes that they would reasonably attain. N Rangone, Errori Cognitivi e 
Scelte di Regolazione, in Analisi Giuridica dell 'Economia, no. 1 (2012). 
24 A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law,passim. 
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either the general public or commercial organizations. ' 25 In this sense, there is a 
departure from the ordinary task of law since the best way to impose a certain con-
duct is precisely to let people be free to choose without imposing a determinate 
behaviour. Notably, these strategies are based on systematic and recurring behaviour 
observed using experiments and other instruments of social inquiry. 
4. The 'Institutionalization' of Behaviourally Informed Policy-Making 
One of the most important methods concerning behavioural change to emerge in 
recent times is the 'nudge' (or nudging) theory. Nudge is an audacious and profitable 
idea to describe the act of gently structuring the choices that people make in order to 
lead them towards particular outcomes. This theory was first applied with this con-
notation by an economist and a lawyer. As such, it is a hybrid concept originating 
from the encounter of these two branches of the social sciences. 26 
The core idea of nudge derives from research in the cognitive sciences, which shows 
how it is possible to use the knowledge of reflective cognitive processes towards 
better decisions by presenting choices in different ways. 27 The term has been de-
scribed as 'any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any option or significantly changing their eco-
nomic incentives. '28 For this reason the two authors have labelled it as a form of 
'libertarian paternalism. '29 
Nudging was branded in the United States as a 'third way' between state interven-
tionism and market driven norms. However, nudge is not a form of regulation, legis-
lation or another word for economic incentives. Yet, nudge may have implications 
for regulatory policy and, as such, is potentially set to revolutionize the way in 
which policies are formulated and implemented.30 It is commonly applied in sectors 
such as health, taxation, public transport and pensions. 
25 Oliver, From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector 
Policy, 686. 
26 R. H Thaler and C. R Sunstein, Nudge. Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness (New Haven & London, 2008). 
27 With the word reflective I mean to indicate a type of decision-making process employed by 
humans that is slow and solid rather than fast and instinctive. See Kahneman, Thinking, Fast 
and Slow. 
28 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge. Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 8. 
29 C. R Sunstein and R. H Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, in: The University 
of Chicago Law Review 70, no. 4 (2003 ). The motto of the book is ' [ c ]hoosers are human, so 
designers should make life as easy as possible.' 
30 This assumption is made by many authors when dealing with nudge. See A. Alemanno and 
A. Spina, Nudging Legally: On the Checks and Balances of Behavioral Regulation, in 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 2 (2014): 430. 
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In this sense, the links between this idea and law are very important. Firstly, law and 
nudge share the same subject: behaviour. Secondly, law and nudge share partially 
the same lexis: words, like autonomy, freedom, and rationality, are values for both 
sides. Thirdly, the authors represent nudge as a relationship between a 'nudger' and 
a 'nudgee' when these interactions happen in a social and institutional environment 
made by laws and directed by political institutions.31 When looking at the effects of 
nudging we should not look only at what a nudge does or does not do to a nudgee (in 
terms of choice), but also whether the adoption of nudging as a policy impacts insti-
tutional structures (which then in tum impact persons)32. 
As a consequence, nudge enlarges the array of state control devices. Legislatures 
and governments can use nudging as another way to achieve their aims; by using it 
they can alter the organization of the contexts, process and environment in which 
individuals make decisions.33 
Even if nudging theories are not a cure for every ill, their discovery and develop-
ment significantly enlarges the range of behavioural informed tools in the hands of 
law- and policy-makers for the purpose of making the machine of government more 
effective and successful in producing expected results. 
In my view, these new, fancy theories help law to face new and complex problems; 
they certainly venture to explore new perspectives in the study of law while contrib-
uting to blending our research with that of other disciplines, such as cognitive sci-
ences and behavioural economics. However, theories like nudge reveal many 
drawbacks and shortcomings which I will talk about later. 
Over the last seven years the insights of the book written by Sunstein and Thaler 
have been criticized by a very long list of scholars; at the same time, a vast number 
of governments have exploited this theory to incorporate behavioural insights into 
the creation of public policies.34 It would be impossible to consider here the huge 
number of articles and reviews that have been written on this subject, even if later I 
will say something on this issue. It is much more interesting here to analyse some of 
the so-called institutional perspectives of nudge, which were first developed by the 
UK Government during the first mandate of the David Cameron Cabinet and then by 
31 A. Barton and T. Griine-Yanoff, From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging - and Beyond, in: 
Review of Philosophy and psychology 6, no. 3 (2015). 
32 R. Lepenies and M Malecka, The Institutional Consequences of Nudging-Nudges, Politics, and 
the Law, in Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6, no. 3 (2015): 428. 
33 One of the pioneering studies in this field is surely the chapter by R. J Bonnie, The Efficacy of 
Law as a Paternalistic Instrument (paper presented at the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 
Lincoln, 1986). 
34 C. R Sunstein, The Council of Psychological Advisers, in: Annual Review of Psychology 67 
(2014): 714 SS. 
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many other governments in the world, notably the US administration under the 
Barak Obama's presidency.35 
In 2010, the UK coalition Government set up the 'Behavioural Insights Team' (BIT) 
as part of a movement away from command-based regulation and fiscal controls in 
favour of 'smarter' strategies that would use behavioural insights rather than rules or 
financial incentives to influence conduct.36 The BIT - also called 'Nudge Unit' -
was created as a small team of civil servants and academics based in the Cabinet 
Office tasked with advising the British government in non-coercive interventions to 
change public behaviour. In 2014, the BIT evolved from a unit of the UK govern-
ment into a private company with a social purpose. 37 
The BIT has released a vast number of reports representing not only the theoretical 
progress of behavioural informed policies, but also devel~pments in such areas as 
health-related behaviour, personal energy saving, reducing tax fraud, job seeking 
and pensions38 These reports are full of examples of purported nudges that have 
been proposed to the Government for implementation. 39 
Partially due to the successes of BIT other nations, including the United States, have 
also established similar institutions.40 On 15 September 2015, by Executive Order, 
President Barak Obama instituted the 'Social and Behavioral Sciences Team' 
(SBST) under the 'National Science and Technology Council' (NSTC) and directed 
Federal agencies to integrate behavioural insights into their policies and pro-
grammes.41 In the first year of activity, this institution produced a vast array of doc-
uments and studies, which are particularly important for the investigation of the link 
between policy goals and individual behaviour.42 
The establishment of 'nudging units' has more recently been planned by other coun-
tries: Australia, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, the Nether-
35 For the UK experience see P. John et al., Nudge, Nudge, Think, Think: Experimenting with 
Ways to Change Civic Behaviour (London, 2013). For the US experience see C. R Sunstein, 
Simpler: The future of Government (New York, 2013). 
36 R. Baldwin, From Regulation to Behaviour Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree, in The 
Modern Law Review 77, no. 6 (2014): 833. 
37 BIT is now partly owned by the Cabinet Office, the charity Nesta, and the employees of the 
same company. See for more details http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk 
38 The BIT website includes many substantial successes. For a catalogue, see 
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co. uk/publications/. 
39 For an analysis see Oliver, From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform 
Public Sector Policy, 692-98. 
40 The US have called the nudging unit 'Social and Behavioral Sciences Team.' 
41 The SBST is chaired by the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. 
42 For more details see https://sbst.gov/assets/files/2015-annual-report.pdf 
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lands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, and even Saudi 
Arabia. 
Even at EU level, Commission offices have taken into consideration the develop-
ment of behavioural informed policy-making. 43 In 2013 the 'Joint Research Centre' 
(JRC) published a report on 'Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU Policy-making,' 
which draws substantially (though not exclusively) on the experience gathered after 
three years of conducting behavioural studies in support of EU policy on consum-
ers. 44 In 2015 the JRC published another report, which helps to design with more 
precision studies on behavioural sciences. The 'DG Justice and Consumers,' togeth-
er with 'DG for Health and Consumer Protection' (SANCO) and the 'Executive 
Agency for Health and Consumers' (EAHC), have incorporated behavioural re-
search in their policy-making and established procedures for ex-ante behavioural 
testing of the effectiveness and the enforcement of policy interventions. 
The brief sketch of the institutional developments of 'nudging units' is helpful in 
supporting the idea that at this moment of time decision-makers need to incorporate 
behavioural insight in the design of public policies and in the protection of consum-
ers from behavioural exploitation by firms.45 The reading of these documents makes 
it clear that the task of devising these instruments necessitates economists, psy-
chologists, sociologists, environmental lawyers, health experts and other profession-
als working together with specialists in these fields must strive to build up a 
complete awareness of a world which is much more complex than in the past. 
Moreover, all these transformations are considerably affecting the conception of law 
and, climbing down this 'theoretical' slope, it is possible to see how they also influ-
ence the idea of many public law elements, such as the functions of the state, the 
making of governmental policies, as well as law-making, and the very elements of 
legal norms, like coercion. 46 
43 In November 2010 the European Commission published the report on «Consumer Decision-
Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics Perspective». See 
http://ec.europa.eu/ consumers/archive/strategy/ docs/final_ report_ en. pdf 
44 R. van Ravel et al., «Applying Behavioural Sciences to Eu Policy-Making»,» in JRC Scientific 
and Poley Reports (2013). 
45 Sunstein, The Council of Psychological Advisers, 716; S. Bhargava and G. Loewenstein, 
Behavioral Economics and Public Policy 102: Beyond Nudging, in American Economic Review 
105, no. 5 (2015): 397-98. 
46 M D Adler, Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholarship, in Theoretical Foundations of Law 
and Economics, ed. Mark D. White (Oxford: Oxford Univ_ersity Press, 2008). 
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5. The Limits of These New ·Strategies 
Even if the insights from the cognitive sciences are contributing to improving the 
law, caution is needed in taking the conclusions of behavioural informed regulation 
too far before successful results of the policies have been shown. Although behav-
ioural law is promising a revolution in the understanding of law, the enthusiasm is 
mainly based on the reception of these theories among scholars and not by the use of 
it in practice. Within the legal academy, the use of the findings and evidence of 
behavioural sciences is having a very large impact particularly on the studies of law 
and economics.47 
Legal scholars, as well as economists and other social scientists, have strongly criti-
cized the assumptions of behavioural law.48 For example, the public discourse 
prompted by nudging and any form of behavioural informed rules has been focused 
on the problems of legitimacy. A great deal of academic attention has been paid to 
the philosophical, ethical and abstract implications of these interventions. 49 Con-
cerns involve fears for autonomy, dignity, transparency, and moral development, as 
well as the risks of manipulation. 50 
Partially deviating from the long list of criticisms of the use of cognitive sciences in 
law, I want to briefly address another important issue that is much more closely 
linked to the study of the function of law as guidance of human behaviour. This is 
related to the search for a new way through which law can force or induce individu-
als to avoid certain risks. 
Modem theories of law have raised the question as to what extent the law should 
allow citizens' freedom of choice relating to risks, which may cause harm to them-
47 For a critique of these theories see S. Frerichs, False Promises? A Sociological Critique of the 
Behavioural Tum in Law and Economics, in: Journal of Consumer Policy 34, no. 3 (2011). 
48 Ulen, The Importance ofBehavioral Law, 110. 
49 A. Alemanno and A.-L. Sibony, eds., Epilogue: The Legitimacy and Practicability of Eu 
Behavioural Policy-Making (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), 325-26. · 
50 See e.g. J. D Wright and Douglas H Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, 
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, in Northwestern University Law Review 106, no. 3 
(2012); C.R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016); Alemanno and Spina, Nudging Legally: On the Checks 
and Balances of Behavioral Regulation; Alemanno and Sibony, Epilogue: The Legitimacy and 
Practicability of Eu Behavioural Policy-Making; Baldwin, From Regulation to Behaviour 
Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree; Lepenies and Malecka, The Institutional 
Consequences of Nudging-Nudges, Politics, and the Law. See also the contributions in the 
volume of K. Mathis and A. Tor, eds., Nudging - Possibilities, Limitations and Applications in 
European Law and Economics (Switzerland: Springer, 2016). 
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selves.51 This phenomenon has been called 'legal paternalism. '52 There are different 
degrees of legal paternalism. 53 There is a hard or strong paternalism, occurring 
when law is used coercively to deprive individuals of choice, on the grounds that 
they cannot exercise that choice wisely. On the other hand, there is soft paternalism 
when freedom of choice is preserved, but the law is used to nudge individuals to-
wards what is generally considered to be preferable conduct. 
How can we decide between these two options? The process of rule-making and in 
general construction of governmental policies must take into consideration both 
these ways of inducing people to behave in a certain way. 
As a result of the use of the insights from behavioural economics, legal scholars 
have noticed that this choice depends on a wide range of elements: not only related 
to the decision of the government or the political process, but also pertaining to the 
possibility of the irrational behaviour of persons (such as cognitive errors). 
Public policy has often relied on the assumption of rationality when accounting for 
human conduct. This has generally been explained as contributing to the lack of 
effectiveness of laws or, worse, the difficulty of implementing a well- crafted poli-
cy.s4 
For a public institution knowing deviation from rationality (the real people) in deci-
sion-making processes may be the secret for a fully implemented policy. As the 
theory of nudging reveals, proper understanding of human behaviour requires 'reali-
ty checks,' such as experiments and acquisition of statistical data. 55 Policy-makers 
must rely on evidence, and not on assumptions, where ideas about people's behav-
iour are first tested and then reassessed. 56 
51 A. Ogus, The Paradoxes of Legal Paternalism and How to Resolve Them, in Legal Studies 30, 
no. 1 (2010): 62. 
52 R. H Thaler and C. R Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, in The American Economic Review 93, 
no. 2 (2003). 'The principle of legal paternalism justifies state coercion to protect individuals 
from self-inflicted harm, or in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, 
toward their own good'. See Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1971). 
53 D. Husak, Legal Paternalism, in The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics, ed. H. Lafollette 
(Oxford, 2003). 
54 Indeed, individuals tend to deviate from neoclassical assumptions of rationality and make 
decisions that can be considered as the product of errors. This awareness has many implications 
for regulatory policies and, as such, is potentially set to revolutionize the way in which policies 
are formulated and implemented. Alemanno and Spina, Nudging Legally: On the Checks and 
Balances ofBehavioral Regulation, 430. 
55 van Bavel et al., «Applying Behavioural Sciences to Eu Policy-Making.», cit. 
56 'With theoretical models of the social sciences being used to make behaviourally sound public 
law arguments, the emergence of empirical arguments was just a matter of time. The predic-
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Therefore, when regulation seeks to change people's ·behaviour it must build a sys-
tem for understanding recurrent cognitive errors, heuristics, and other biases that can 
alter the implementation of rules and their effectiveness. The need to collect evi-
dence of this sort clearly emerges in the regulation of many public services and in 
particular in the legislation on consumer protection in financial markets and social 
services, such as healthcare. The institutionalization of behavioural studies in the 
design of public policy could represent the first step on the ladder of this improve-
ment in law- and policy-making. 
The use of nudging, as a way to deviate from the problems raised by relying on the 
rational-actor model, helps us to focus on the last critical point of behavioural in-
formed law- and policy-making. It is common sense that the simple and explicit 
assumption of rational action enjoys the great benefits of predictability and tractabil-
ity: one can predict how a rational actor will react to any given legal rule, institution 
or incentive. Law gains certainty from a clear and predictable behavioural model. 
Erroneously one could think that by embracing the findings of the cognitive sciences 
law becomes increasingly vague, uncertain and generative of contradiction. 57 Im-
portantly, the experimental findings do not show that human behaviour is chaotic 
and unpredictable. Quite the contrary, experiments in cognitive sciences demonstrate 
that humans behave in a similar way and that their choices are predictable. 58 
Another reason why this is not true must be found outside the legal realm, because 
the relevant behaviour considered by legal rules is not a product of the law itself. 
Law takes into consideration human conduct, which is a cultural and social product, 
with reference to a moment of time and the specific place in which it occurs. There-
fore, law needs the contribution of other disciplines, whose role is needed to single 
out the behaviour considered by legal rules. 
6. Conclusions 
I would like to make four comments to end my contribution to this conference. I can 
summarize the first three of them by recalling three examples of proof on which this 
work has helped to focus. 
tions the theoretical models generate can be tested empirically, and with the law focusing on 
the decision of hard cases and real-life public policy, have led to behavioral extensions of the 
model, drawing on insights from cognitive and social psychology'. See E. V Towfigh, 
Empirical Arguments in Public Law Doctrine: Should Empirical Legal Studies Make a 
«Doctrinal Tum»?, in International Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 3 (2014): 673-74. 
57 A. Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 239. 
58 D. Ariely, Predictably Irrational (New York: HarperCollins, 2009). 
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The first derives from one limit that I have already outlined in the previous section: 
law is not a self-sufficient discipline. Innovation in law has always been subject to 
input from other fields of knowledge. The social order plays an important role not 
only as the field where law is enforced, but as the way law is created. 
The second is that better law- and policy-making should consider both evidence 
from other disciplines and try to design complex solutions for complex problems 
(theories of complexity). In this sense the aspiration of simplification in law-making 
is not realistic, since it tries to reduce something that cannot always be performed. 
The third demonstrates that law-making cannot consider only rational man as the 
agent of law. Nudge, in particular, confirms that human behaviour, which moves 
preferences and choices, is context-dependent. Besides offering a richer and psycho-
logically more plausible account of human conduct, a behaviourally informed law 
model is also likely to suggest a wider range of factors that influence behaviour and 
hence a wider range of possible levers by which behaviour might be modified. In 
this way, the broadened account is likely to prove more useful to policymakers and 
others seeking to influence behaviour at a more aggregate level. 
However, in addition to these assumptions there is another issue regarding nudging 
strategies that is worth understanding and nailing down. Briefly speaking, what the 
nudge theory is exactly remains unclear for lawyers. Those who consider it simply 
as a new way to regulate or a new 'soft law' are making a big mistake.59 Rather, 
nudge theory belongs to a new type of 'interpretative instruments' in the hands of 
governments for improving policy effectiveness. 60 
Hence, nudge theory is simply a new tool, as well as the impact assessment or the 
measurement of burdens imposed by regulation, which helps the improvement of the 
regulatory process. Cognitive insights performed by experiments and other tools, 
which are able to gather empirical evidence, can help regulators to increase the 
chances that the pursued behaviour occurs. 61 However, caution should be applied in 
59 See A. Candido, La Nudge Regulation. Interpretazioni Dottrinali e Prime Applicazioni 
Pratiche, in Amministrazione in cammino, no. 7 (2012); E. Selinger and K. Powys Whyte, 
Nudging Cannot Solve Complex Policy Problems, in European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2012). 
60 Not by chance Cass Sunstein in the foreword to the book edited by Alberto Alemanno and 
Anne-Louise Sibony highlights that nudge can help government by giving a new instrument to 
cope with the burden of justification in designing new public policies. See C. R. Sunstein, 
Foreword: The Ethics of Nudging, in Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective, ed. 
A. Alemanno and A.-L. Sibony (Oxford, 2015), IX-XVII. 
61 The argument is made also by Towfigh, Empirical Arguments in Public Law Doctrine: Should 
Empirical Legal Studies Make a «Doctrinal Turn»; P. Cserne, Introduction: Legislation, Legal 
Episteme, and Empirical Knowledge, in The Theory and Practice of Legislation 1, no. 3 
(2013). 
I 
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the use of these instruments, such as nudge, since they are not always the best option 
when protected values are particularly sensitive, such as health, the environment, 
and safety. In these circumstances traditional instruments must be combined with 
innovative strategies in order to better define how to reach the goals of laws and 
regulation. 
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